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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KARL WINSNESS AND ASSOCIATES,
A Partnership,
PlaintiffAppellant,
Case No.

15501

vs.
M. J, CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS,
INC., A Utah Corporation,
DefendantRespondent.
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
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PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now the Defendant, M. J. Conoco Distributors, Inc.,
acting by and through its attorneys Allen H. Tibbals and Michael

z.

Hayes of the law firm of Tibbals and Staten, and under and

pursuant to Rule 76(e) (1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions this Court for a rehearing or a modification of the decision
of this Court in the above captioned matter for the reason and
upon the grounds that:
1.

This Court failed to accord to the proceedings

before this Court, due process in that:
a.

The Court has rendered its decision acting on an

erroneous fundamental premise which is not supported in the record
or the briefs of either party, to-wit, that "The service station
at issue in the litigation was owned by the Plaintiff-Appellant."
(Opinion Justice Stewart dated March 6th, 1979, first sentence.)
The opinion continues, "Plaintiff leased the station to Defendant . • . "

This also is not a fact and cannot be supported from

either the briefs or the record.

These erroneous assumptions

color the entire decision of the Court.
The fact as shown by the record and briefs of the parties
show without contradiction that the station was built by DefendantRespondent in 1972 and at all times was and now is owned by
Defendant-Respondent M. J. Conoco. (RlS,36,119,5, Respondent's
Brief page 1,3)

Under the assumption made by the Court, the

capital at risk in the venture and the relationship between
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the parties is entirely at variance from the actual facts wi~
which the District Court dealt.
b·

This Court acted peremptorily at the hearing before

the Court, ordering the Defendant-Respondent to proceed first
in the argument before the Court stating that it did so, as
voiced by Chief Justice Crockett, who said in essence that this
case was before the Court on appeal from a summary judgment
based upon motion supported by affidavit which the Court did
not favor and the Court believed therefore that this placed Ue
weight of persuasion upon the Respondent to show cause why the
Court should not reverse the decision of the lower court inasmuch
as there appeared to be factual issues disputed.

Even when

Respondent brought to the attention of the Court that this was
erroneous and that, in fact, the matter was before the Courton
appeal from a directed verdict granted by the Court on motion
of Defendant-Respondent after four full days of trial and onehalf days of argument before the court sitting with a jury, and
that the Court had granted the directed verdict because of the
failure of the plaintiff to prove its case, the Supreme Court
nevertheless compelled the Defendant-Respondent to go forward
first with its argument and refused, at the close of argument, to
allow the privilege usually accorded the Appellant of a rebuttal
to the argument of the Respondent.

We believe this to be a sig·

·
ct on
nificant departure from established procedure having an impa

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the decision of the Court because the Court has incorporated
into its opinion, unrefuted statements made in the oral argument by counsel for the Appellant which, had the Respondent
been accorded its opportunity to respond to the Appellant,
would have been properly refuted.

By so altering its procedure

and by failing to examine the record with sufficient care to
ascertain even the fundamentals of the ownership of the property involved and the nature of the contract between the parties,
the Defendant-Respondent has not had due process or a fair and
impartial hearing before this Court which is the right of the
Defendant-Respondent under the laws and the Constitution of
this State and of the United States.

As a result thereof, the

Defendant-Respondent is confronted with a determination by this
Court that the Appellant owns the service station and that the
agreement between the parties is a lease thereof.

This confronts

the Defendant-Respondent with an unconsciounable burden on retrial
and the peril that the unsupported and incorrect statement of
this Court may be alleged to be Res Judicata and binding on
parties to this litigation.
2.

The decision of this court ignores the established

rule that it is the Plaintiff's burden to establish his primae
facia case as to the existence of an actual breach of contract
and damages resulting to the Plaintiff therefrom by credible
evidence which would hold to the minimum, speculation by the jury
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acting under accepted standards and the guidance of the Court's
instructions.
After four full days of trial devoted exclusively to
the Plaintiff's presentation of his evidence and after the
Plaintiff had rested, the trial judge recognized that there was
not sufficient credible evidence to present to the jury as to
either the breach of contract as claimed by the Plaintiff, nor
as to any measurable damage resulting to the Plaintiff.

The

action of the lower court in giving the directed verdict was take
after prolonged argument by counsel and due deliberation by the
Court.

The serious deficiencies in the Plaintiff's case were

carefully evaluated by the lower court and the Court's action is
entitled to the respect long recognized as due the action of the
lower court which has the opportunity to evaluate the testimony
of the witnesses, their conduct on the stand, validity, the
quality of the evidence presented and the nature of the presenta·
tion.

The opinion of the Supreme Court ignores the existing

standards by which the lower court acted and gives no new guide·
lines on which a retrial can be based.
Defendant-Respondent submits herewith its Brief in
Support of the within Petition in accordance with the Rule$ of
Civil Procedure in such cases made and provided.

-5-
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BRIEF OF PETITIONER
Point I
BY FAILING TO EXAMINE THE RECORD BEFORE IT IN
THE INSTANT CASE WITH SUFFICIENT CARE TO BE
APPRISED OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTS UPON WHICH
THIS LITIGATION IS BASED, THIS COURT HAS MADE
AN ERRONEOUS FINDING CONCERNING THE OWNERSHIP
OF THE SERVICE STATION AND THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH, IF NOT CORRECTED,
COULD BE CLAIMED TO HAVE MADE THESE MATTERS RES
JUDICATA AT THE REHEARING OF THE CASE, THUS
IMPOSING ON DEFENDANT AN UNFAIR AND UNCONSCIONABLE BURDEN AND DEPRIVING DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
OF A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS.
The introductory statement of the Court's official opinion
filed in this case March 6th, 1979, is as follows:
"The Plaintiff below and Appellant here (hereinafter or sometimes "Lessor") owns a gasoline service
station on the interstate highway between Salt Lake
and Wendover at an isolated location known as 'Delle'
about 53 miles west of Salt Lake City. Plaintiff
leased the station to Defendant.
"
This is not the fact.

The record shows, (TR pp36&37, Exhibit 6)

as do the briefs of the parties, that the service station, subject matter of the controversy and litigation, was built by the
Defendant-Respondent, M. J. Conoco, at its expense, was owned by
the Defendant Company at all times and is still owned by that
Company.
The Court's decision erroneously states that the service
station is owned by the Plaintiff-Appellant rather than the
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Defendant-Respondent.

This error is extremely prejudicial to

the Defendant in that it is a judicial determination as to the
ownership of the service station and could, therefore, be considered as Res Judicata at the retrial of the case.

Defendant·

Respondent respectfully submits that this fundamental error
requires either that Defendant-Respondent be given the opportuni:
of a rehearing in the Supreme Court on this matter or, at least,
that the opinion of the Court be amended to correct the mistate·
ment of fact concerning the ownership of the service station and
to show that the agreement of the parties was not a lease of the
service station, but of the land on which the station was built
by M. J. Conoco, Defendant-Respondent, and at all times the owner
thereof.
It was always the risk capital of M. J. Conoco that was
involved in the building and operation of the service station,
not that of the Plaintiff-Appellant.

The error in this funda-

mental concept colors the entire opinion of this Court and the
failure to ascertain this fact from the record which is replete
with reference to the fact that the station was built and owned
by M. J. Conoco, is not due process and deprives the Defendant·
Respondent of a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts in
this case and the law which should be applied thereto.

It

prevents a fair review of the lower court's action,for that
· was
Court, at all times, recognized that ownership of the station
in Defendant-Respondent.
-7-
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The law of property has long recognized that one's
failure, if it can be found that there was such a failure, to
operate or to employ his own property to the best advantage,
constitutes a far different legal wrong than to fail to operate
or to manage the property belonging to another properly and in
accordance with contract.

In fact, conduct in the handling,

management and control of property entrusted to one by another,
whether by lease or otherwise, may be a wrong when such treatment
of one's own property would constitute no wrong whatever.

Such

is an important aspect of this case, for here the station had
been built, the capital at risk and all of the responsibility
therefore was that of the Defendant-Respondent, M. J. Conoco
Distributors, Inc.

It had built the station on land leased from

the Appellant and fundamental to the concept of the relationship
was that an equal or greater investment in a restaurant facility
was to be made by the Plaintiff-Appellant to become a part of the
total package which induced M. J. Conoco to make the investment
for the service station.

This reciprocal duty colored the entire

transaction relating to the hours of operation, it being contemplated that the station and the restaurant together, in a 24-hour
operation, would be an attractive thing at this location and
would entice the public to patronize both the service station
and the restaurant.

Either alone had a much more hazardous and

less likely chance of success and, in fact, were so isolated that

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the singular operation of the service station alone, without
the required restaurant facility, was an economic impossibility,
These facts are clear from the reading of the record and were
understood by the trial court at the time that he granted
Defendant-Respondent's motion for a directed verdict.

Point II
THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY ACQUITTED HIS
RESPONSIBILITY TO INTERPRET THE CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES REGARDING CONSTRUCTION
OF A LAGOON. WITHOUT SHOWING ANY ERROR IN
LAW OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT, THIS COURT HAS REVERSED THE TRIAL
COURT RESULTING IN DEPRIVING THE DEFENDANTRESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The lower court recognized and applied the correct rule
and measure of damages to the situation regarding the construe·
tion of the sewage lagoon as cited by this Court, namely:
"The measure of damages where there has been
defective or incomplete performance of a construction contract is as set forth in the Restatement
of Contracts, Section 346(1) 1932 as:
'· •• the reasonable cost of construction
and completion in accordance with the contract, if this is possible and does not
involve unreasonable economic waste; . . '"
(Opinion of March 6, pg. 5)

(Emphasis ours)

This point was raised in the Court below and Plaintiff
refused to accept the Court's ruling.

The Plaintiff insisted
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that he was entitled to the monthly return he expected to
receive on a restaurant facility which he, of his own violition,
elected not to build.

The argument on this point between court

and counsel for Plaintiff is contained in the record. (Pgs. A-41
line 22 to A-45 line 25.)
Both the attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant and the
Judge recognized the facts testified to and even admitted by
the Supreme Court in its decision that the lagoon could not be
completed and made functional without the effluent from the
restaurant.

The lagoon could not be created or maintained with-

out this effluent from an economic standpoint because the presence
of water in the lagoon was essential to its maintenance.
could only be made available by hauling it by truck.

Water

To haul

water solely for the purpose of making the lagoon functional
was economic waste.

The lower court recognized this.

In view of the refusal of the Plaintiff-Appellant to
abide by the decision of the Court and to make any effort to
show damages as requested by the lower court, does this appellate
Court have the right to ignore the situation and simply overlook
the defiance of the Plaintiff-Appellant, and give him a further
opportunity to again try to make his case, and still stay within
the purview of due process.

At some point the rights of the other

litigant should be considered.

We submit that by refusing to

conform to the ruling of the Court and accept the measure of
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damages which the lower court imposed correctly, according to
the decision of the Supreme Court, the Plaintiff-Appellant is
precluded from putting the Defendant-Respondent to the expense
of a further trial on the same issues which were knowledgably
and correctly ruled on by the lower court as shown by the record.
Judge Leary correctly stated:
"And there isn't any reason in here that he
couldn't have built a restaurant if he wanted to
and he elected not to do so. And his reason for
electing not to do so is that he claims that this
man or the corporation breached the agreement and
his damages that he is asking are based upon a
decision that he made. It has nothing to do with
what the Defendant may have done."
Obviously Judge Leary decided, after hearing all of the testimony
at trial, that the contract required the Plaintiff to build his
restaurant before he could complain that the sewage lagoons were
not completed.

It was Judge Leary's prerogative to weigh

the

testimony on this issue and make a decision which he did in fact
do.

The Defendant should not be compelled to retry this issue

when Judge Leary has already made a judicial determination as
to the construction of the contract which determination was not
passed upon by the Appellate Court - simply ignored.
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Point III
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT BY EXCUSING
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FROM THE NECESSITY TO
MAKE OUT A PRIMAE FACIA CASE, THE STANDARD TO
WHICH HE WAS HELD BY THE LOWER COURT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, DEPRIVES
THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS.
The burden of the Plaintiff in any action is to make a
primae facia case before he rests, which includes the necessary
proofs from which, in a contract action, the breach of contract
can be shown and the quantum of damages be reasonably determined.
(Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. vs. Landis, 503 P2d 444, 28 U2d 392,
also Keesling vs. Bosamalsis, 539 P2d 1043.)
The Plaintiff in four days of trial did neither.

He

presented some evidence that the service station in question was
not open at a few given times.

The duration or frequency of

closure was not given in any manner, though it could have been
had the Complaint been legitimate for the Plaintiff had employees
in the area who could have kept track of the hours of closure
if it was significant to do so.

Under the status of the limited

testimony available on closure of the station, how could the
jury be instructed to determine the amount of time closed?

Should

the jury be allowed to go to the jury room, where they are not
going to receive any further enlightenment than had been presented,
and decide

that the station was closed one day a week, two days

a week, one hour a month, three hours, or whatever?

-12-

There is
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not one word of guidance from which the jury could logically
make a finding as to the amount of time lost in the three year
period of time involved in the litigation.

It would be outright

speculation with no guidance of any kind.
Secondly, there was absolutely no credible evidence to
show that if the station was closed it affected the quantity of
gasoline which would have been sold.

No gallonage had been

guaranteed. The Court was well aware that the Plaintiff was
receiving a substantial land rental every month in excess of the
reasonable value of this isolated land and that it had been paid
without fail. Plaintiff relied on the testimony of a so called
"expert" who admitted he had no actual knowledge of the

operatin~

conditions at the station, had never worked there, did not know
anything about the traffic pattern except from a study which
he misread and for which,

(though admittedly the error was sig·

nificant and plaintiff's counsel knew of the error) no effort
was made to either offer corrective testimony or to rehabilitate
the evidence.

Despite this, the opinion of the Supreme Court is

stated to be that the lower court should have allowed the jury
to speculate as to the loss of gallonage sales.

To do so is

an abuse of due process and flies in the face of every case
this Court has heretofore decided on the issue.
to the FEDECO case

The court refers

(23 U2d 306, 462 P2d 706 [1969]) as supportin:

the statement that "some degree of uncertainty is inevitable in
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the damage determinations of the type involved in this suit."
To be sure this is true, but since the writer tried and was
attorney of record in the Fedeco case and is therefore thoroughly
familiar with that case on both the original trial, the appeal
and the retrial, the degree of uncertainty there was in no
way comparable to this case and the case cannot stand for
support of the primae facia case presented by the Plaintiff in
the instant case.

There was absolutely no uncertainty as to the

breach of contract in the Fedeco case.

The contract called

for the delivery of a certain amount of leased space.
actually made available was known.
specific.

The amount

The breach was clear and

There were issues as to whether the change had been

consented to by the Plaintiff, but the claimed breach was not
uncertain in any particular.

The measure of the damages was the

loss in sales resulting from the lack of space.

Contrary to

the situation in this case where absolutely no reliable evidence
as to the gallonage which should have been sold or might have
been sold in the subject station was offered, in the Fedeco case
there was an actual traffic count of the number of people
entering the building.

There were comparative sales figures

covering adjoining space during the exact time in question,
there were figures showing the rate of increase in business of
the other businesses in the same building during the same time.
There were valid comparative studies showing the relationship
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in sales volume between the type of merchandise offered by the
plaintiff in that case and similar merchandise offered in adjoining space.

The only speculation the jury was required to

make in the Fedeco case was whether other factors regarding
management policies of the particular plaintiff would make these
figures which were offered inapplicable.
present case.

Contrast that with the.

No hours of failure of operation of the station

has been shown.

No sales figures of the station in question

or any station in the vicinity during the period in question
have been shown or offered.

The only gallonage figures have

been figures based on an Exhibit which covers a period more than
two years prior to the questioned period, taken under circumstanw
that were admittedly totally different than_
cumstances at the time of the alleged breach.

the existing cirThere is no

guidance from which the jury can make any computation.
straight speculation.

It is

In the Fedeco case, the jury had a definite

formula to apply to ascertain what might have been done without
the breach.

The only thing that could not be made relatively

certain was the impact of the plaintiff's merchandising policies
on these figures.

A vastly different situation than confronted

the lower court in this case.

The lower court has correctly

exercised its prerogative to take the case from the jury because
the Plaintiff failed in four days of trial to make out the essen·
tials of a prima facia case.

The decision of the Supreme court
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points out no error of the lower court in making its ruling.

It

gives no guidelines or standards by which the Court can guide
the jury in a retrial of the case.

To impose on the Defendant-

Respondent for a retrial under such circumstances is not due
process and it is not justice.

It simply gives the Plaintiff-

Appellant another swing at the same ball which it missed the
first time.

Up to this case it has not been considered due

process to give the Plaintiff three strikes before declaring him
out.

To rely on the "connnon sense of the jury" to make up for

the imprecise proof of breach and of damages, as the opinion of
this Court does (Opinion Pg. 4, last paragraph) in an area of
life in which the average juror has no experience, namely service
station operation at an isolated outpost, licenses abuse of the
jury function.
Point IV
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT ADMITS THAT THE LOWER
COURT MAY HAVE ERRED ON THE GROUNDS ON WHICH IT
EXCLUDED EXHIBIT 35, A GALLONAGE TABLE, BUT
CONTINUES TO RULE THAT THE EXHIBIT IS RELEVANT
AND ADMISSIBLE. THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ATTACKED
THE FOUNDATION OF THE EXHIBIT ON OTHER GROUNDS
WHICH STILL EXIST, AND WHICH MAKE THE EXHIBIT INADMISSIBLE, AND THE STATEMENTS MADE IN ORAL ARGUMENT WHICH RESPONDENT HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE
AND UPON WHICH THE SUPREME COURT APPARENTLY RELIED
IN RULING THE EXHIBIT ADMISSIBLE ARE NOT CORRECT.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE COURT OPINION, IF ALLOWED TO
STAND, WILL MEAN THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT IS CONFRONTED ON RETRIAL WITH AN EXHIBIT WHICH THIS COURT
HAS STATED IS ADMISSIBLE WITHOUT EVER HAVING BEEN
CORRECTLY OR PROPERLY ADVISED AS TO THE FOUNDATIONAL
DEFECTS.
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Plaintiff-Appellant had the opportunity at trial to

The

establish relevancy of Exhibit 35 which he could not do.

facts are uncontested that Exhibit 35 represents gasoline sold
at a different service station for the first six months of 1972,
Under any standard heretofore recognized by this Court, this
Exhibit is not admissible.

We submit that to deprive the

Defendant-Respondent of his right to object on that basis, deprives Defendant-Respondent of due process.

The decision of thi;

Court gives no guidelines as to what use can be made of Exhibit
35 at the retrial of this matter.

As mentioned in the Court's

decision, the Appellant does not argue about the inadrnissibiliti
of gallonage reports from other service stations, yet as the
decision now stands, a new jury would be allowed to use an Exhibit that represents gallonage sold at a different service
station under totally different circumstances, for over half
the period covered by the Exhibit, which was more than two years
prior to the period in question in the instant litigation.
This Court has never heretofore allowed a jury to speculate as
to damages through the use of figures representing sales at a
different location under different circumstances occurring more
than two years prior to the questioned period.
·respectfully submits

Petitioner

that Exhibit 35 is simply not capable

of being applied to the factual situation in this case.

The

fact that the Court gave as its reason for excluding the Exhibit,
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a reason other than foundational, should not deprive the Defendant-Respondent of the right to challenge the Exhibit on foundational grounds as was done (Rl35, L-3-13) and to have the court
rule thereon.

The decision of the Appellate Court recites:

"The sales data of the Delle station for
1972, the last year the station was concededly
in nearly continuous operation." (Opinion Pg. 3
1st paragraph)
These factual assumptions by the Court are not true as an examination of the Record shows.

The lower court was aware of these

deficiencies in the Exhibit as the testimony showing the deficiencies was given before that court.
Again, in this instance it was within Judge Leary's
clearly defined prerogatives, as outlined by the Utah Rules of
Evidence, to exclude this Exhibit when it was shown to him to
in fact represent gallonage sold at a different service station
and under very different circumstances.
Point v
THE CHAi.~GE OF ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES BY THIS
COURT WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE PARTIES AND WITHOUT ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE AND MEET
THE CHALLENGE, CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DUE
PROCESS.
In this case, on the date of oral argument, when the
case was called before the Court by the Chief Justice, and
counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant announced that he would
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require in the presentation of his argument to the court a full
20 minutes, the maximum allowed by the Court for oral argument
I

the comments of the Chief Justice then made clear that this
Court did not accord to this litigation much significance and
felt that the matter did not merit that much time of the court.
Subsequently, when the argument was actually called for, the
Chief Justice announced that, in the Court's opinion, the usual
procedures of the Court should be reversed and in place of the
Plaintiff-Appellant presenting his argument first and the Respon·
dent being allowed to answer the same, by reason of the fact tho:
this case was before the Court on a Summary Judgment granted on
Motion and Affidavit, the weight of pursuasion lay with the
Defendant-Respondent for it appeared to the Court that there
were factual issues which should have been determined on trial
and that therefore, the Court wished the Defendant-Respondent
to show to the Court for what reason the Court should not rever>
the action of the lower court.

As promptly as could be, counsel

for the Defendant-Respondent advised the Court of its primary
error, namely that this case was not before the Court on a
Summary Judgment supported by Affidavit and based upon Motion,
but was there after a week's full trial before court and jury
wherein the Plaintiff had been unable to prove its case and the
court had therefore entered a directed verdict because there was
not sufficient proof to submit to the jury.

Despite being nofr
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fied and advised of its error, the Court nevertheless persisted
in requiring the Defendant-Respondent to proceed with the oral
argument.
In the argument made by the Plaintiff-Appellant, an
attorney who was not party to the action in the lower court
and who therefore spoke only from his understanding of the
record and not from knowledge of what had transpired in the
lower court, was permitted to make statements which were incorrect and which, had the Defendant-Respondent been allowed its
ordinary position, would have been refuted in the argument of
the Defendant-Respondent.

When Defendant-Respondent, through

its counsel, asked whether or not he was to be accorded some
time in rebuttal as would be the case having assumed the argument position of the Appellant, the Court denied this privilege
stating through the Chief Justice that the Court was going to
adjourn for lunch and that unless there was something of critical
importance that could be presented in one minute, there was
nothing more that the Court desired to hear.

This unusual

procedure, contrary to the established procedures of the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah for generations, fails to accord with
the standards of due process recognized by the Constitution of
the State of Utah and the Constitution of the United States.
While the irregularity in procedure could perhaps be overlooked
under normal circumstances, the fact that the Court was misled
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by statements made by the counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant
which found their way into the Court's opinion in deciding the
case and which are refuted by the record, lend significance and
importance to the irregularity of the procedure.
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CONCLUSION
Counsel for Defendant-Respondent feels compelled by
duty and responsibility to the client, as well as by his obligation to this Court as a member of the bar of this court, to
attempt by this petition and supporting brief to bring to the
court's attention significant discrepancies between the facts
related in the Court's decision, as the basis upon which it
decided the case, and the actual uncontested and admitted facts
as shown by the Record and briefs on file in the action.

These

fundamental errors have manifestly influenced not only the
outcome of this case on appeal, but unchallenged and uncontested,
they constitute a threat to the ability of the Defendant-Respondent to have fair and impartial treatment on a retrial of the
case.

These erroneous statements pose the hazard that they may

be claimed to be binding, factual determinations by this Court
and Res Judicata.
We respectfully submit to the Court that any litigant
is entitled to have the Appellate Court evaluate the case starting
from the same basic premise and admitted factual situations as
the lower court had before it in taking whatever action the
lower court took - particularly when the fact is as fundamental
as the ownership of the property involved.

-22-
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We believe that even in the unlikely event that this
Court should be of the opinion that these factual errors could
not change the Court's ultimate opinion, the Petitioner is
entitled to have the decision of the Court corrected so that it
contains a true and accurate statement of the admitted facts and,
on retrial, the Defendant-Respondent is not handicapped by being
confronted with the necessity to try and overcome the impression
created on the trial court by the errors in the decision sending
the case back for retrial.

We also believe that the Court shoulc

correct the decision wherein it would deprive the Defendant and
Respondent on retrial of the right to challenge the PlaintiffAppellant's proposed gallonage Exhibit for foundational defects.
As pointed out, the language of the decision would seem to

m~e

this Exhibit admissible when the fact that foundational facts
essential to this admission have never been ruled on by the lower
court.
We humbly, sincerely, and respectfully beseach this
Court to take cognizance of the plight of the Defendant-Responder
and accord to this litigant fair and just relief from the unearn:
and improper burden imposed by the Court's decision.
Respectfully submitted,
TIBBALS AND STATEN
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed 2 true and correct coptes
of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
THEREOF to Craig Stephens Cook, Esq., Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant, 3645 East 3100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
this

84109,

day of March, 1979, postage prepaid.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered 2 true and correct copies
of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
THEREOF to THOMAS A. DUFFIN, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Suite 510, Ten Broadway Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of March, 1979.

Received two copies of the foregoing Petition this
day of March, 1979.

THOMAS A. DUFFIN
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